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ABSTRACT: South America has a lack of confidence in almost all its public institutions, 
and judiciaries are not the exception. This article starts with general aspects of judicial 
independence, impartiality and accountability, and then shows an overview of regional 
judicial reforms in the last decades. Based on a widely accepted conception of bureaucratic 
judiciary, this article aims to analyze how its elements work on South American 
democracies; which will be useful to identify critical issues and emerging challenges on 
Judicial Councils, recruitment process of judges and magistrates, technical qualification, 
and disciplinary liability. 
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RESUMEN: En Sudamérica existe una desconfianza en casi todas sus instituciones 
públicas, y sus judicaturas no son la excepción. Este artículo comienza con aspectos 
generales sobre independencia judicial, imparcialidad y responsabilidad, para luego 
mostrar un panorama general de las reformas judiciales hechas en la Región las últimas 
décadas. A base de una concepción ampliamente aceptada de magistratura burocrática, este 
artículo procura analizar cómo sus elementos funcionan en las democracias sudamericanas; 
lo que será de utilidad para identificar aspectos críticos y retos emergentes relacionados a 
los Consejos de la Magistratura, procesos de selección de jueces y magistrados, formación 
especializada y responsabilidad disciplinaria. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Sudamérica; Burocracia; Magistratura Burocrática; Independencia 
Judicial; Responsabilidad; Consejos de la Magistratura. 
 
 
RESUM: A Sud-amèrica existeix una desconfiança en gairebé totes les seves institucions 
públiques i les seves judicatures no són l'excepció. Aquest article comença amb aspectes 
generals sobre independència judicial, imparcialitat i responsabilitat, per després mostrar 
un panorama general de les reformes judicials realitzades a la Regió les últimes dècades. A 
força d'una concepció àmpliament acceptada de magistratura burocràtica, aquest article 
procura analitzar com els seus elements funcionen en les democràcies sud-americanes; que 
serà d'utilitat per identificar aspectes crítics i reptes emergents relacionats als Consells de 
la Magistratura, processos de selecció de jutges i magistrats, formació especialitzada i 
responsabilitat disciplinària. 
 
PARAULES CLAU: Sud-amèrica; Burocràcia; Magistratura Burocràtica; Independència 








According to the current Latinobarómetro Report, Latin America has a serious lack of 
confidence in almost all its political institutions and public organizations, except for the 
military and police forces. For instance, confidence on the judiciary decreased from 30% to 
26 % in comparison with the 2015 report (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2016). 
On judicial independence rankings, South America is divided into two groups. On the one 
hand, most South American countries present low scores. Venezuela is a paradigmatic 
example, so it is classified on the bottom of chart. On the other hand, there are better placed 
countries, e.g. Uruguay and Chile.1 Those results are similar to wider reports about the quality 
of civil and criminal justice.2 
Unfortunately, most of the region has weak and discredited courts and tribunals. The length of 
cases, inefficient enforcement mechanisms, inadequate resources, poor judicial decisions and 
inadequate selection/training of judges are common concerns regarding South American 
judicial systems (Agrast, Botero & Ponce, 2015). Another typical concern is corruption, 
which constitutes an important factor in influencing people's decision not to go to court to 
resolve a dispute; this is the case especially in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru.3 
Addressing these issues is a difficult task that requires an analysis from different perspectives. 
The aims of this article are, first able, to study the origins, nature and current status of South 
American bureaucratic judiciary; and then, to identify critical issues and emerging challenges 
they face today. 
 
 
                                                   
1 By comparing 140 countries, Global Competiveness Report 2015-2016 reveals important data about the region. 
The judicial independence indicator includes this question "In your country, how independent is the judicial 
system from influences of the government, individuals, or companies? [1 = not independent at all; 7 = entirely 
independent]". From lower to higher we find Venezuela (#140), Paraguay (#137), Ecuador (#133), Argentina 
(#129), Bolivia (#126), Colombia (#114), Perú (#112) and Brazil (#92); all of them in the lower part of the chart. 
Fortunately, Chile (#31) and Uruguay (#20) are on the upper side (Schwab, 2016). 
2 The World Justice Project’s Rule of law index 2016 analyses 130 countries, including South American 
countries, except for Paraguay. This index is composed by 9 factors; two of them are about justice. The Civil 
Justice Factor ranks as follows: Venezuela (#112), Bolivia (#108), Peru (#90), Ecuador (#89), Colombia (#70), 
Brazil (#58), Argentina (#48), Chile (#32) and Uruguay (#17). The Criminal Justice Factor, in turn, ranks 
Venezuela (#113) last in the region, followed by Bolivia (#112), Colombia (#91), Peru (#90), Ecuador (#86), 
Brazil (#78), Argentina (#67), Chile (#37) and Uruguay (#34) (Botero, Agrast & Ponce, 2016). 
3 But it is less important in countries like Uruguay and Chile. On that scale, Brazil, Argentina and Colombia are 
placed in the middle (Agrast, Botero & Ponce, 2015). 
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2. WHAT DOES THE JUDICIAL BRANCH NEED? 
Judicial independence is a transcendental value of contemporary democracies (Shetreet, 
2011). It is, nevertheless, an unclear and complex concept due to its relationship to given 
social, historical and functional contexts. In terms of the functional context, when judges 
adjudicate, they are not bound or influenced by any political branch, public or private 
organization or economic powers. So, judicial independence – prima facie – is a negative 
concept.4 
The core of the concept of judicial independence encompasses the different ways to keep 
judges away from those influences and pressures, while they are adjudicating. Therefore, this 
concept is relational (Salzberger, 2012) and depends on the relationship between judges, 
parties, government and economic power.5Nevertheless, not all external influence, pressure, 
inducement or interference is forbidden, but only those that are improper or incompatible with 
adjudication.6 The main objective of the rule in question is to prevent unnecessary or useless 
information from having a bearing on decision-taking process, so judges are able to focus 
exclusively on relevant legal information (Macdonald & Kong, 2012). 
This principle is conceived as relative. Independence for judges and magistrates is not 
absolute on historical, institutional or even functional perspectives. And, for sure, it is not a 
privilege for judicial authorities (Villaescusa, 2016), but a fundamental right part of the due 
process of law, a right recognized by national constitutions and human rights treaties 
(Chamorro, 2007). 
Finally, another characteristic of judicial independence is instrumentality. Most scholars agree 
that judicial independence is not a goal in itself but a means to obtain something more 
                                                   
4 In spite of that, there is also a positive angle on judicial independence. Certain scholars do not accept the 
term“judicial independence”, so they prefer others like ‘supremacy’ (Friedman, 2004) or ‘neutrality’ (Linares, 
2003). 
5 The idea of relational principle is also accepted in political science, and corresponds to the notion that judges 
have autonomy from other authorities, institutions and the public in general (Russell, 2001). To make it simpler, 
LINARES, S. (2003) prefers to use the phrase “absence of pressures”. 
6 Adjectives like 'improper', 'inappropriate' or 'unwarranted' are included on articles 2 and 4 of the UN Basic 
Principles on the independence of the Judiciary, article 2 of the Universal Charter of the judge and articles 1.1 
and 1.3 of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct. Forbidden interferences are, for instance, those from 
political powers or public authorities that generate de iure or de facto obstacles to the adjudication process 
(Zeitune & Andreu-Guzmán, 2007; Gonzales Mantilla, 2009). The problem is thus how to recognize an 
acceptable interference. Obviously, higher court case law is accepted as proper influence on judicial decisions 
(Russell, 2001). Other appropriate influences are interpretative statute law, valid evidence and parties’  
arguments in a case (Linares, 2003). MARTINEZ ALARCÓN, M.L. (2004) mentioned examples like parliamentary 




valuable. But what it is exactly aimed at? Impartiality is the most common answer7, but there 
are alternative perspectives on this matter.8 
Impartiality, for instance, is an important notion for understanding other concepts like justice, 
equality before the law and reasonability; even the idea of corruption has no sense without it 
(Kelly, 2004). The legitimacy of judges - or any other public authority - depends on 
impartiality; therefore, a fair adjudication is only possible if it is done by someone who is 
alien to the legal conflict (Pérez-Cruz, 2015). This is also a negative concept: judges shall 
perform their duties without bias or prejudices, and that is a previous condition of a fair 
judicial decision (Nieto, 2004) (Jiménez Asensio, 2012). However, an absolute “absence of 
preconceptions” is impossible for any individual, considering the human mind is no blank 
piece of paper (Frank, 1930). It is impossible to go inside a judge's brain and verify if he is 
biased on certain subjects. Because of that, scholarship and case law consider impartiality 
through two aspects. The first one, a subjective approach to impartiality, focuses on the 
personal interests of a judge on certain cases; something extremely difficult to demonstrate. 
The second, an objective approach, does not prioritize judges’ thoughts, but social perceptions 
about his role. The principal goal on that approach is to avoid any reasonable doubts on 
judicial neutrality, case by case. For that purpose, an objective test is an important tool to 
identify preconceptions, using as criteria “the sight of a reasonable observer”.9Charts of 
judges and procedural codes have various mechanisms to prevent partiality in general or in 
specific cases. The most common are recusal tools, disqualifications and bans on extrajudicial 
activities. 
Furthermore, the positive perspective of judicial independence is focused on mandatory 
bounds that judges have to follow. Generally, the principal boundary of judicial activity is the 
law (especially statute law on civil law countries). Regarding democracy, judges have to 
respect and enforce statute law produced by Parliaments. This is another way of legitimizing 
                                                   
7 This is a general opinion of Latin European scholars, for instance, CAPPELLETTI, M. (1990), RICO, J.M & 
SALAS, L. (1990), GONZALEZ GRANDA, P. (1993) and DELGADO DEL RINCÓN, L. (2002). 
8 SEIBERT-FOHR, A. (2012) and QUINTANA CARRETERO, J.P (2008) consider that achieving the due process of 
law is the most transcendental goal. Similarly, according to European Council, the fair trial is an 
overwhelmingly important objective to achieve (Bustos, 2016). 
9 The ‘reasonable observer’ criterion is frequently used in common law countries. For instance, 28 U.S. Code § 
455 says: “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding 
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned” (Taruffo, 2009). That criterion is also on international 
instruments about judicial Independence: Universal declaration on the independence of Justice of Montreal 
(1983), “Singhvi” Declaration (1989), Bangalore principles on judicial conduct (2002) or Ibero-American Model 




their role (Linares, 2003). 
Finally, judicial independence is not enough for an efficient and democratic justice service. 
The other side of the coin is judicial accountability (Blakenburg, 2004; Seibert-Fohr, 2012), 
generally defined as an obligation or willingness to accept responsibility for one's actions 
(Knaul, 2014). At this point, the most important goal is to maintain a balance between these 
two principles. Irresponsibility must not be the price that citizens pay for an independent 
justice system (Cappelletti, 1990); at the same time, a judge placed under extreme control 
becomes a dependent servant easy to manipulate (Delgado, 2002). In order to prevent abuses 
of power or improper influence, clear control standards must be established (Knaul, 2014). 
Accountability is a polysemous concept that involves several control mechanisms over 
judicial behavior. Basically, it has three levels: explanatory accountability, amendment 
accountability and “sacrificial” accountability. The last one refers to resign or dismissal from 
office. Related to that, there are three important dimensions: the obligation of answering to 
control organisms (answerable to), to explain about decisions taken (account for) and the 
acceptance of the risk of being sanctioned or dismissed in case of wrongful behavior 
(answerable for, censurable for) (Hernández, 2016). 
Judicial accountability is vertical when it is owed to the people or society, and horizontal 
when it is addressed to other public branches or institutions (Hernández, 2016). In addition, it 
is not only referred to an individual justice operator, since all of the judiciary is involved. To 
sum up, it could be individual or institutional, depending on who is accountable (Knaul, 
2014). 
On this context, an independent body in charge of protecting independence and controlling 
administration personnel must be established. It has to be composed by members of the 
judiciary and other important sectors, e.g. scholars, legal bars, etc. To find a balance between 
independence and accountability is a difficult task. Nowadays, priority has been given to 
strengthening judicial independence, so a lack of regulation on accountability mechanisms is  
a common issue (Knaul, 2014). 
3. JUDGES: AUTHORITIES OR PUBLIC SERVANTS? 
There are many differences between common law and civil law countries, but one on that 
scholars pay plenty of attention regards the recruitment and discipline mechanisms of judges. 
The differences between the two judicial systems refer to professional judiciaries (in Common 
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Law systems) and bureaucratic judiciaries. 
Those differences are graphically represented with a continuous line whose two extremes are 
the professional judiciary, on one side, and the bureaucratic judiciary on the other. The former 
is closely connected to bars and professional associations, and its principal criteria for the 
appointment of judges and magistrates are prestige and experience. The bureaucratic 
judiciary, in turn, is related to hierarchical structures, whose most valuable criteria for 
selection is formal education in law. Those are ideal models and national judicial systems 
around the world can be placed at various points between those extremes. It is often said that 
England and France are the most important examples for each model (Guarnieri & Pederzoli, 
1999). 
The professional judiciary is based on a close relationship between judicial authorities and 
legal practitioners. Usually, selection methods are horizontal, which means that judges are 
selected from the universe of lawyers, taking into account experience, prestige and respect 
from colleagues. In addition, recruitment authorities are part of other political branches, such 
as Parliament or the Executive. In the eyes of certain commentators, they possess a great deal 
of independence.10 
On the other hand, the bureaucratic judiciary considers a judge as a public servant with 
special characteristics. That is the reason why judicial selection and dismissal are, in general, 
similar to civil service procedures. From the standpoint of sociology, bureaucrat judges are 
seen as employees with the same status as other public servants, powerless in public and 
political affairs, and without creative freedom on the adjudication process (Toharia, 1975). 
Frequently, selection methods include public competitions and judicial schools. Recruitment 
systems are designed to look for technicians, experts on law with no political attachments, 
rather than prestigious attorneys. The required profile is simple: young lawyers with an 
important academic background and not enough experience are greatly preferred; so they can 
easily afford long-term education on a judicial school. Meritocracy is an important tool not 
only to fulfill offices with talented lawyers, but also to avoid influences from politicians and 
their lobbies (Guarnieri & Pederzoli, 1999). 
To sum up all those elements, several scholars agree with GIUSEPPE DI FEDERICO’S (1978) 
four characteristics of the bureaucratic judiciary: selection through public competition, 
                                                   
10 For further details, see GUARNIERI, C. (2002), TARR, G.A. (2010), SCHAFFNER, B.F. & DIASCRO, J.S (2011), 
MALLESON, K. (2011) and TURENNE, S. (2012). 
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hierarchical organization, internal socialization and generalist recruitment. 
According to a pessimist perspective, however, bureaucrat judges suffer from what could be 
considered a state of schizophrenia. Being at the same time dependent servants and guards of 
an independent branch of the state is clearly a difficult – or impossible – task to accomplish 
(Aparicio, 1996). Yet, a bureaucratic judiciary can overcome this state, if we consider judges 
as servants of society rather than of a hierarchical organization (Xiol Ríos, 2009). 
4. WELCOME TO THE SOUTH: SOUTH AMERICAN JUDGES AND THE 
JUDICIARY 
To understand how the bureaucratic judiciary model is implemented in Latin America, it is 
necessary to mention a few details about government systems in the region. After the 
independence revolutions, Latin American states were built over cultural conflicts dating from 
colonial times that local elites were unable to solve. Those unresolved conflicts have, in turn, 
brought political instability. This is the principal way to explain several class and political 
struggles in the region (Bradford, 1990). 
In addition, South American democracies have faced in recent history an array of important 
obstacles for their development, such as regional, class or even ethnical conflicts, autocratic 
leadership, the weakness of political parties, instability of control systems and, finally, coups 
d’état and dictatorships (Antón & Soria, 2014). 
Political actors frequently failed to build strong constitutional norms, and historical 
experience demonstrates a tendency to implement constitutional reforms after changes in the 
balance of power. Power struggles between the Legislative and the Executive are therefore 
very common (Negretto & Ungar, 1996). A consequence of that is the evident weakness of 
South American presidential systems, where presidents are in a permanent state of oscillation 
between lack of power and abuse (Sartori, 1994). 
This is obviously not the ideal environment to implement an independent and strong judiciary. 
Historically, Judicial administration was in charge of Higher Courts, strongly influenced by 
the Executive and political parties in government (Negretto & Ungar, 1996). Nowadays, 
judicial systems have a discreet profile and a less relevant role in South American 
democracies (Pásara, 2009). 
In terms of the roots of the South American judiciary, European colonization had an obvious 
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influence on pre and post- independence judicial structures. Under Spanish colonization, 
judicial functions were executed by local authorities (City mayors and Corregidores), which 
would lead to confusion between adjudication and general public administration. Even under 
the Ancien Regime, Spanish judges and their colleagues in American colonies were 
considered as simple public servants. After the independence revolutions, this condition did 
not change (Toharia, 1975). 
Later, European and South American bureaucratic judiciaries followed different paths, 
specially due to the influence of the United States. One of those differences pertains to the 
administration of the courts, which was attributed to the Supreme Courts instead of the 
Ministry of Justice, as was common in continental Europe (Fix-Zamudio, 1977). 
With this context in mind, how does one describe an average bureaucrat judge? EUGENIO 
RAÚL ZAFFARONI (2009) classifies magistrates in three models: empirical-primitive, 
technical-bureaucratic and legal-democratic model. His opinion is that Latin American judges 
are part of the empirical- primitive model, whose principal characteristics are a lack of 
minimum legal-technical level and the arbitrariness of their selection process.11 
This perspective also applies to the ordinary bureaucracy in the region. JOAN PRATS I CATALÀ 
(2005) defines it as an imperfect and not reasonable bureaucracy, with high degrees of 
arbitrariness, patronage networks, bribery, favoring acts and corruption. If these faults are 
found in the ordinary bureaucracy, it is very likely that the regional judiciary could share at 
least a few of them. 
After World War II, Europe implemented important changes on their judicial structures. Two 
of those changes were followed in Latin America: public competition as a selection method 
and the formation of judicial councils (Salamanca, 2014; Pérez-Cruz, 2015). 
In the late 20th century, judicial reform was at the core of the Latin American political agenda. 
The first attempts, performed in the 80s, were circumstantial, disorganized, and limited to 
legislative reforms without any previous study. The results were clearly unfruitful. Since the 
90s, however, a second round of judicial reforms has been started with its central strategies 
consisting in the development of access to justice, judicial independence and institutional 
efficacy (Pásara, 2009). 
                                                   
11 According to this author, a technical-bureaucratic model has a selection process capable of recruiting well- 
prepared judges, for being members of a strong judicial hierarchy. The legal-democratic model is a superior 
level. At this level, court administration is attributed to a judicial council, an independent body not part of the 
legislative or executive branches 
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An important goal of this new wave of judicial reforms pertained to the administration of 
courts. As we said previously, Ministries of Justice did not have the same strength in Latin 
America as they had in Europe in this regard. Instead, Supreme Courts took on classical 
administrative functions. Later, another problem arrived: those functions took too much time 
to perform, considering their adjudicative tasks (Gómez Marinero, 2011). 
To solve this persistent problem in our region, judicial councils provide an interesting 
alternative. Basically, there are three important arguments for the creation of those organisms: 
the development of creative adjudication, beyond the enforcement of law; a strong increase in 
judicial cases and the creation of more court rooms; and, the specialization of law fields and, 
consequently, of judges and tribunals (Fix-Zamudio, 1977). 
Peru and Brazil created the first judicial councils in the region, and that trend was followed by 
almost all other countries.12 Nevertheless, there is no unique model of judicial council in 
South America (Pásara, 2011). The differences are pertain to council members – only judges 
or external members –, functions – judicial career, governance and discipline – and 
hierarchical relationships – part of the higher courts, below them, autonomous.13 
5. CRITICAL ISSUES AND EMERGING CHALLENGES 
There are several emerging challenges for South American judiciaries in terms of their 
organizational, functional, managerial and economic dimensions, besides the matter of its 
interaction with other political branches. This article aims to analyze those challenges that 
closely relate to the bureaucrat judge and the judicial career. I believe there are four critical 
issues our bureaucratic judiciaries face: a. Judicial Council members; b. Education and 
technical qualification; c. Appointments; d. Accountability and liability, especially in terms of 
discipline. 
Judicial Councils were created as a guarantee of judicial independence, to protect the 
judiciary and individual judges from inappropriate influences from other political branches. 
What is the weak point of those organizations? There is a reasonable fear in our region that 
                                                   
12 Peru did it in 1969, during a military dictatorship. Brazil included a Conselho de Justica Federal on its 1988 
Constitution. Nowadays, after reforms on 2005, it is called Conselho Nacional de Justica Brasileiro. They were 
followed by Colombia (1991), Paraguay (1992), Bolivia (1994), Argentina (1994) and Ecuador (1996 and 1998). 
13 For instance, in Chile and Costa Rica, the Judicial Council is part of the Supreme Court. In Brazil and Mexico, 
it is below the Highest Court. In Argentina, the Judicial Council is above the whole of the federal judiciary, 
except for the Supreme Court Justices. In Peru, El Salvador and Ecuador, on the other hand, the Judicial Council 
can discipline any judge and justice, even from Supreme Courts (Pérez-Cruz, 2015). 
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those councils could be potentially “kidnapped” by political parties and other powerful 
groups. 
Experiences in the Region show us that Judicial Councils are subject to similar ways of 
pressure and manipulation as the structures they replaced, and can become truly weak. There 
is an evident lack of mechanisms to avoid attempts of capture by the Legislative or the 
Executive (Negretto & Ungar, 1996). The UN Special Rapporteurs on the independence of 
judges and lawyers observed that the participation of judges as a majority group on Judicial 
Councils’ composition is required for an independent Judiciary. Lower participation of judges 
or inclusion of political members (e.g. officials from other branches of the State) is not 
recommended (Despouy, 2009; Knaul, 2013). 
Recent experiences demonstrate how political leaders with high popularity use their electoral 
power to change rules for Judicial Councils’ composition. In Ecuador, the Constitution of 
2008 established the Consejo de la Judicatura as head of Judicial Administration and 
discipline. According to the original constitutional design, the Consejo had to be composed by 
nine members: six lawyers and three professionals in management fields, selected through 
public competition and organized by a neutral authority. In 2011, former President Rafael 
Correa started a campaign against the original composition of the Consejo, whose slogan was 
“meter la mano en la Justicia” (we will put our hands on Justice). Correa’s popularity was 
transcendental to change the Council’s membership through a constitutional amendment 
referendum. Five members integrate the current Council, two of them are officials from the 
Executive and Legislative branches, a model totally opposite to the UN Special Rapporteur’s 
recommendations (Pásara, 2014). 
Another recent example occurred in Argentina three years ago. The Argentinian Consejo de la 
Magistratura’s composition includes attorneys and law professors, selected by their peers. 
The Argentinian Congress – with a pro-government majority – and President Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner enacted a new selection method for those members: partisan elections 
without participation of bar associations or universities. This method, far-away from our legal 
traditions, tried to take advantage of the ruling party’s great popularity. It started a debate in 
the academic and social realms about democratization of justice and the corporatism of legal 
profession. Finally, however, the statute law and decrees enacted for the purpose of the reform 
were overruled by Supreme Court in a case called “Rizzo” (Pérez-Cruz, 2015). 
A second critical issue pertains to the technical qualification of judges. Education and training 
for judges is not only a right for them, it is also a duty of the judiciary in order to give an 
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efficient and well-qualified judicial service. Each training program, adapted to national 
circumstances, is useful to fill academic blanks on candidates or young judges and as a social 
binding mechanism inside judicial career (González Pascual, 2016). 
But, what is the knowledge level of an average lawyer running for judge? Legal education in 
our region suffered important transformations in the twentieth century. In the past, access to 
college education was elitist, a privilege enjoyed by the upper classes in Latin American 
society. Currently, our universities have a wider social composition thanks to several factors. 
For starters, the number of universities increased, even in regions away from bigger cities. In 
addition, there are more students that come from economic and ethnical minorities as well as 
a greater access of women to higher education. Consequently, access to university has 
increased in its geographical basis and diversity. In spite of that, discrimination is an enduring 
problem (Pérez Perdomo, 2007; Bergoglio, 2007). 
Although wider access sounds very positive prima facie, it brings troubles if educational 
structure is not fully prepared. Wider access can affect the quality of college education, and 
not only because of the higher quantity of students. Higher education’s new social 
composition has brought with it the region’s deficiencies in elementary education, so the 
increase in equity of access has produced, at the same time, inequity in quality (Bergoglio, 
2007). 
Prestige is part of the selection criteria for the professional judiciary model, but does not play 
a role in the bureaucratic model. In it, judicial applicants are not the best students from Law 
school, because the latter do not consider a judicial career as an option for success. This fact, 
transplanted to our reality, brings another problem: judicial candidates reflect deficiencies 
from law schools and elementary schools. In our region, schools for judges make enormous 
efforts to reinforce law and elementary knowledge. Successful judicial school models have 
been implemented by Chile, Brazil and Colombia, in a similar form to Spanish training 
programs (Pásara, 2009). Finally, UN Special Rapporteur on independence of judges and 
lawyers observed that Central American law faculties are of low quality and recommended 
the involvement of universities on judicial training programs as well (Knaul, 2013). 
The third issue is related to the recruitment process. There is a trend towards patronage, 
ideology or party affiliation as the real motivation behind selection processes (Negretto & 
Ungar, 1996). Public competitions could be a useful tool to solve this particular problem, 
provided that political authorities have honest intentions to free judges of pressures 
(Salamanca, 2014). The UN Human Rights Committee have emphasized that the notion of an 
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independent tribunal does not tolerate a system where the functions of the judiciary and 
executive are not distinguishable, or where the latter is able to control or direct the former 
(Despouy, 2009). In our region, higher politicization and lack of clear criteria are two capital 
problems of recruitment. 
Recent notable cases of political influence on selection have occurred in Ecuador, Argentina 
and Venezuela. In Ecuador, in 2005, Congress dismissed all Supreme Court members and 
appointed new Justices; although the Constitution foresaw a corporative method of selection, 
which only Supreme justices could partake in. Immediately, the new Supreme Court, known 
as Pichi Corte, annulled criminal cases that involved former Presidents and Vice-presidents. 
The dismissed magistrates then started a lawsuit in the Inter-American Human Rights 
System.14 Finally, the Pichi Corte was dismissed after the overthrow of President Lucio 
Gutierrez. Years later, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights delivered the judgment 
called the "Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador” (I/A Court H. R., 
2013). 
On December 2015, five days after rising to power, Argentinian right-wing President 
Mauricio Macri appointed two Federal Supreme Court justices while Congress was in recess. 
The constitutional appointment method consists in the nomination by the president with 
approval of the Senate. Even if the new justices were prestigious law professionals, criticism 
from the press and universities were so strong that President Macri was force to take a step 
back ("El decreto de Macri", 2015; "Constitucionalistas y opositores", 2015). 
Finally, the Venezuelan judiciary presents relevant empirical data to analyze. In that country, 
judicial independence has suffered continuous attacks from the last administrations. For 
instance, the current power struggle between Legislative and Supreme Tribunal. After losing 
parliamentary elections in 2015, the government majority in Congress took advantage of their 
last days in office to reorganize the Supreme Tribunal and appoint justices politically close to 
them. When the new majority in Congress arrived, it overruled those appointments, but that 
decision was annulled by the Supreme Tribunal. Nowadays, this vicious cycle continues with 
no hope for a solution in the near future.15 
The UN Special Rapporteurs on this field have also raised concerns about appointment of 
provisional judges. The use (or abuse) of this figure for long and undefined terms could be a 
                                                   
14 For more information, see RESTREPO, R. (2014) and PAREDES, F. (2016). 
15 For more information about this case, and Venezuela’s judicial crisis: see BREWER-CARÍAS, A. (2016). 
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way to avoid tenure and ordinary dismissal procedures.16 It can also implicate independence 
of judiciary if it is used to assign sensitive cases to particular courts or judges.17 
On bureaucratic judiciaries, judicial liability and discipline is a special concern because it is a 
critical point of balance between the independence and the accountability of judges. Usually, 
judicial discipline is attributed to Judicial Councils with one important boundary: errors in 
judicial decisions or decisions overturned on appeal or reviewed by a higher judicial body 
must not be reasons for dismissal or other sanctions (Despouy, 2009). This limit is 
particularly relevant on legal systems where Judicial Councils are administrative authorities 
instead of special courts or tribunals. 
Inappropriate use of disciplinary procedures against judges is a common threat to judicial 
independence (Villaescusa, 2016). To stop these practices, the UN Special Rapporteurs on 
this field recommends: creation of an independent organism for runing those procedures –e.g. 
Judicial Councils–; statute law’s clear guidance and objective criteria for disciplinary 
infractions; disciplinary decisions’ review by superior authorities –preferably from the 
judiciary– and restricted use of this accountability mechanism (Despouy, 2009; Knaul, 2014). 
In this context, is an administrative review over judicial decisions conceivable? The answer 
must be negative. Even if disciplinary authorities cannot overrule adjudications, there is the 
chance of intimidating judges with administrative punishment because of their adjudicatory 
tasks. On a recent report about the Central American judiciary, the UN Special rapporteur 
expressed her worries about Costa Rican judicial discipline, since judges can be sanctioned 
for their opinions in court (Knaul, 2013). 
South American judiciaries also present unfortunate experiences on this field. In Venezuela, 
for instance, there is no respect for judicial opinions, so the whole content of court rulings can 
be analyzed by disciplinary authorities.18 Ecuadorian judicial discipline presents similar 
troubles. A recent report criticizes the analyses of judicial reasoning – a “re-interpretation” of 
statute law – made on discipline rulings and the legitimacy of the Consejo de la Judicatura as 
a disciplinary authority (Pásara, 2014). 
                                                   
16 Special Rapporteur GABRIELA KNAUL remarked the case of Costa Rica, which judicial body has a high 
percentage of provisional judges (Knaul, 2013). 
17 A famous criminal case involved the President Rafael Correa against the Diario El Universo –one of the most 
important journals in Ecuador– and its editors; Judicial Council appointed provisional judges, that were 
constantly changed (“Caso El Universo, nuevamente sin jueces”, 2012). 
18 On case “Cedeno v. Venezuela” (2010), UN Human Rights Committee observed that Venezuelan judicial 
discipline had unclear procedures and subjective criteria for dismissal (Knaul, 2014). For more details about 
Venezuelan experience on this field, see Dobarro Ochoa (2006). 
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In both cases, unclear criteria to punish judicial behavior is the key. Broadly defined 
disciplinary infractions, such as “lack of grounds”, “inappropriate grounds” o “inexcusable 
error”, give the opportunity for judicial authorities to influence future adjudications not only 
of disciplined judges, but other bureaucrat-judges who do not want to jeopardize their tenure 
in office. 
In Hispanic comparative law, there are a few alternatives to solve this. The first alternative is 
to convert Judicial Councils into high courts, e.g. the Colombian Consejo Superior de la 
Judicatura. Another option could be to leave judicial errors to criminal law19, but UN Human 
Rights Committee considers that alternative as going against judicial immunity.20 Finally, the 
Spanish Judicial Power Act requires a higher judicial ruling before a disciplinary procedure 
for a lower judge on account of his opinion in court. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Bureaucracy implies the idea of hierarchical networks. The principal challenge of the 
bureaucratic judiciary model is precisely to avoid this association in order to guarantee 
autonomy and individual independence for judges. This general problem becomes an even 
more complicated issue in South America, a region where political instability and power 
struggles are very common. 
Since the 1980s, South American governments have been implementing legal and structural 
reforms to their judicial branches, but those changes have proven ineffective in the absence of 
political will. Political forces – especially those in power – have to realize that they are not 
eternal and that an independent judiciary is the best arbitrator in case they become a minority 
(Negretto & Ungar, 1996). 
Appointment and dismissal procedures designed in our region are usually appropriate to 
achieve judicial independence and accountability. Nevertheless, the experiences mentioned 
above demonstrate that it is not difficult for political powers to avoid usual procedures and 
achieve influence over judges and tribunals. 
To sum up, static rules are not enough. Confidence on the judiciary will decrease much more 
if political interferences on judicial tasks continue. The paradox lies therein: if an independent 
                                                   
19 CASTAÑEDA OTSU is in favor of this solution (Castañeda, 2012). 
20 Special attention on the case CCPR/CO/72/PRK, para. 8; A/56/44 (Supp.), paras. 37 and 39. (Despouy, 2009). 
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judicial body does not exist and there is no political will to build one, how interferences in 
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